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Abstract : This paper advocates the usefulness of new theories of uncertainty for the 
purpose of modeling some facets of uncertain knowledge, especially vagueness, in A.l.. It can 
be viewed as a partial reply to Cheeseman's (among others) defense of probability. 
0. Introduction 
In spite of the growing bulk of works dealing with deviant models of uncertainty in 
artificial intelligence (e.g. [141), there is a strong reaction of classical probability tenants 
((1 ]-[2] and (16] for instance), claiming that new uncertainty theories are "at best 
unnecessary, and at worst misleading" [1]. Interestingly enough, however, the trend to go 
beyond probabilistic models of subjective uncertainty is emerging even in the orthodox field 
of decision theory in order to account for systematic deviations of human behavior from the 
expected utility models. This paper tries to reconcile the points of view of probability 
theory and those of two presently popular alternative settings : possibility theory [22], [51 
and the theory of evidence [19]. The focus is precisely on the representation of subjective 
uncertain knowledge. We try to explain why probability measures cannot account for all 
facets of uncertainty, especially partial ignorance, imprecision, vagueness, and how the 
other theories can do the job, without rejecting the laws of probability when they apply. 
1. Representing . uncertainty 
Let fP be a Boolean algebra of propositions •. denoted by a, b,c .. . We assume that an 
uncertain piece of information can be represented by means of a logical proposition to which 
a number, conveying the level of uncertainty, is attached. The meaning of this number is 
partly a matter of context. Following Cheeseman [1], g(a) is here supposed to reflect an 
"entity's opinion about the truth of a, given the available evidence". Let g(a) denote the 
number attached to a. g is supposed to range over (0, 1 J, and satisfies limit conditions g(O) = 
0 and g(1) = 1, where 0 and 1 denote the contradiction and the tautology respectively. 
1.1 Some limitatjons of a probabilistic model of subjectjve uncertainty 
If g is assumed to be a probability measure, then g(a) = 1 means that a is certainly true, 
while g(a ) = 0 means that a is certainly false. This convention does not allow for the 
modeling of partial ignorance in a systematic way. Especially it may create some problems 
in the presence of imprecise evidence, when part of it neither supports nor denies a. First, 
to allocate an amount of probability P(a) to a proposition a compels you to allocate 
1-P(a) to �he converse proposition 'not a' (-,a). It implies that P(a)=1 means "a is true" and 
P(a)=O means "a _ is false". ln case of total ignorance about a, you are bound to let P{a) = 
1-P(-.a)=.S. If you are equally ignorant about the truth of another proposition b then you must 
do it again : P(b )=1 - P(-.b) = .5. Now assuming that a logically entails b (-.a v b is the 
tautology 1), you come up with the result that P(-.a ..... b)= P (b) - P(a )=0 ! This is a paradox : 
how can your ignorance allow you to discard the possibility that ...,a ..... b be true ! For instance 
a::"horse no 4 will win the race" b:"horse with an even number wins the race", and the 
probabilistic modelling of ignorance leads you to the surprising statement "no horse with an 
even number other than 4 will win the race". What is pointed out is that probability theory 
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offers no stable, consistent reference value for the modelling of ignorance. This issue is 
important since even experts are often in situation of partial ignorance (e.g. on the precise 
value of a probability !) . The way a question is answered depends upon the existence of 
further questions which reveal more about the structure of the set of possible answers. This 
is not psychologically satisfying. 
Of course probability theory tenants would argue that this is not the proper way of 
applying probability theory. First you should make sure about how many horses are in the 
race and then your ignorance leads you to uniformly distributing your probabilities among the 
horses following the principle of maximum entropy (13]. This is good for games of chance, 
when it is known that dice have only 6 facets. Sut in the expert system area, they usually 
play with objects without exactly knowing their number of facets. An important part of 
probabilistic modelling consists of making up a set of exhaustive, mutually exclusive 
alternatives before assessing probabilities. For instance, in the horse example, this set must 
account for the constraint "a implies b"; it leaves only 3 alternatives: a, ...,a"' b, ...,b to which 
probabilities must be assigned. The difficulty in A.l. is that this job is generally impossible 
to do, at least to do once for all. Knowledge bases must allow for evolving representations of 
the universe, that is the discovery of new unexpected events, without having to reconstruct 
a new knowledge base out of nothing, upon such occurrences. At a given point in the 
construction of a knowledge base, the expert may not be aware of all existing alternatives. 
Of course you can always use a special dummy alternative such as "all other possibilities". 
But the uniformly distributed probability assignment derived from Laplace's insufficient 
reason principle is not very convincing in that case ! Moreover the expert may not always be 
able to precisely describe the alternatives he is aware of, so that these descriptions may 
overlap each other and the mutual exclusiveness property needed in probability theory, is 
lost. Despite this not very nice setting, one must still be able to perform uncertain reasoning 
in knowledge bases ! Quoting Cheeseman [1], "if the problem is undefined probability theory 
cannot say something useful". But artificial intelligence tries to address partially undefined 
problems which human experts can cope with. This presence of imprecision forces us out of 
the strict probabilistic setting - this do�s not mean rejecting it, but enlarging it. 
Even· when an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive alternatives is available it is 
questionable to represent the state of total or partial ignorance by means of an uniformly 
distributed probability measure. The most recent justification for this latter approach 
seems to be the principle of maximum entropy (e.g. (13]). However, in the mind of some 
entropy principle tenants, there seems to be a confusion between two problems : one of 
representing a state of knowledge and one of making a decision. The kind of information 
measured by Shannon's entropy is the amount of uncertainty (pervading a probability 
assignment) regarding which outcome is likely to occur next, or what is the best decision to 
be made on such ground. The word "information" refers here to the existence of reasons to 
choose one alternative aqajnst another. Especially you are equally uncertain about what will 
happen when flipping a coin whether you totally ignore the mechanical properties of this 
particular coin, or you have made 1 ,000,000 experiments with the coin, and it has led to an 
equal amount of heads and tails. You are in the same state of uncertainty but certainly not in 
the same state of knowledge : in the case of total ignorance, you have !1Q. evidence about the 
coin ; in the second situation, you are not far from having the maximal amount of evidence, 
although being uncertain due to randomness. In artificial intelligence problems we want to 
have a model of our state of knowledge in which ignorance is carefully distinguished from 
randomness. This is important because when uncertainty is due to ignorance, there is some 
- hope of improving the situation by getting more evidence (flip the coin, for instance). When 
uncertainty is due to experimentally observed randomness, it seems difficult to remove it by 
getting more information. Distinguishing between ignorance and randomness may be useful 
for the purpose of devising knowledge based systems equipped with self-explanation 
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capabilities. The maximal entropy principle was not invented to take care of this distinction, 
and fooks irrelevant as far as the representation of knowledge is concerned. It may prove 
more useful tor decision support-systems than tor approximate reasoning systems. 
1.2 Beljef functjons 
In the situation of partial ignorance the probability of a is only imprecisely known, and 
can be expressed as an interval range [C(a), Pl(a)] whose lower bound can be viewed as a 
degree of certainty (or belief) of a, while the upper bound represents a grade of plausibility 
(or possibility) of a, -i.e. the extent to which a cannot be denied. Total ignorance about a is 
observed when there is a total lack of certainty (C(a) = 0) and complete possibility (PI(a)=1) 
for a. A natural assumption is to admit that the evidence which supports a also denies 'not a' 
(-.a). This modeling assumption leads to the convention 
C(a) = 1 - Pl(-.a) (1) 
which is in agreement with g(a) = 1 - g(-.a), where g(a) and g(-.a) are imprecisely known 
probabilities. This equality also means that the certainty of a is equivalent to the 
impossibility of -.a. The framework of probability theory does not allow for modelling the 
difference between possibility and certainty, as expressed by (1 ) . Functions C and PI are 
usually called lower arid upper probabilities, when considered as bounds on an unknown 
probability measure. See [20] and [8] for surveys on lower and upper probabilities. 
Using (1 ), the knowledge of the certainty function C over the Boolean algebra of 
propositions f? is enough to reconstruct the plausibility function Pl. Especially the amount of 
uncertainty pervading a is summarized by the two numbers C(a) and C(--.,a). They are such that 
C(a) + C(-.a ) � 1, due to (1 ). The above discussion leads to the following conventions, for 
interpreting the number C(a) attached to a : 
i )  C(a)=1 means that a is certainly true: ii) C(-.a)=1 ¢:::> Pl(a)=O means that a is certainly false. 
i i i )  C(a)=C(-.a) "' 0 (i.e. Pl(a)=1) means total ignorance about a. In other words a is neither 
supported nor denied by ·any piece of available evidence. This is a self-consistent, 
absolute reference point for expressing ignorance. 
i v )  C(a)=C(-.a)=0.5 (i.e. Pl(a)=0.5) means maximal . probabilistic uncertainty about a. In other 
words the available evidence can be shared in two equal parts : one which supports a and 
the other which ·denies it. This is the case of pure randomness in the occurence of a. 
Note that total ignorance implies that we are equally uncertain about the truth of a and -.a, 
as well as when C(a)=C(-.a)=.S. In other words ignorance implies uncertainty about the truth 
of a, but the converse is not true. Namely, in the probabilistic case, we have a lot of 
information, but we are still completely uncertain. Total uncertainty is more generally 
observed whenever C(a)=C(-.a)e(O,O.SJ; then the amount of ignorance is assessed by 1-2 C(a). 
The mathematical properties of C depend upon the way the available evidence is 
modelled and related to the certainty function. In Shafer theory , a body of evidence (� ,m) is 
composed of a subset � � f? of n focal propositions, each being attached a relative weight of 
confidence m(ai). For all ai E �, m(ai) is a positive number in the unit interval, and it holds 
I i = 1,n m(ai) = 1 (2) m(O) = 0 (3) 
(3) expresses the fact that no confidence is committed to the contradictory proposition. The 
weight m(1) possibly granted to the tautology represents the amount of total ignorance 
since the tautology does not support nor deny any other proposition. The fact that a 
proposition a supports another proposition b is formally expressed by the logical 
entailment, i.e. a .... b ( = ...,a 'V b ) = 1. Let S(a) be the set of propositions supporting a other 
than the contradiction 0. The function C(a) is called a belief function in the sense of Shafer 
(and denoted 'Bel' ) if and only if there is a body of evidence (� ,m) such that 
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1:1 a, Bel(a) = La1 e S(a) m(a1) (4) ; 1:1 a, Pl(a) = La1 e S(...,a)c·{O} m(a1) (5) 
where 'c' denotes complementation. Clearly, when the focal elements are only atoms of the 
Boolean algebra fP (i.e. S(a1)={a1}, for all i=1,n) then l:la, S(-.a)=S(a)c·{O}, and Pl(a)=Bel(a),l::la. 
We recover a probability measure on fP. In the general case the quantity Pl(a) -Bel(a ) 
represents the amount of imprecision about the probability of a. Interpreting the Boolean---­
algebra fP as the set of subsets of a referential set n, the atoms of fP can be viewed as the 
singletons of n and interpreted as possible worlds, one of which is the actual world. Then a 
focal element a1 whose model is the subset M(ai) = A1 � n corresponds to the statement : the 
actual world is in A1 with probability m(A1). When Ai is not a singleton, this piece of 
information is said to be imprecise, because the actual world can be anywhere within Ai. 
When A1 is a singleton, the piece of information is said to be precise. Clearly, Bel = PI is a 
probability measure if and only if the available evidence is precise (but generally scattered 
between several disjoint focal elements viewed as singletons). 
Note that although Bel(a) and Pl(a) are respectively lower and upper probabilities, the 
converse is not true, that is any interval-valued probability cannot be interpreted as a pair 
of belief and plausibility functions in the sense of (4) and (5) (see [20], [8]). 
1.3. Pgssibi!ity measyres 
When two propositions a and b are such that a e S(b), we write a 1- b, and 1- is called the 
entailment relation. Note that 1- is reflexive and transitive and equips the set fF of focal 
elements with a partial ordering structure. When fF is linearly ordered by 1-, i.e .• fF ={a1 .... ,an} 
where a1 1- a1+ 1• i = 1,n-1, the belief and plausibility functions Bel and PI satisfy [21] 
'v'a, 'v'b, Bel(a A b) = m!n (Bel(a). Bel(b)) Pl(a .., b) = max (PI(a), Pl(b)) (6) 
Formally, the plausibility function is a possibility measure in the sense of Zadeh [22]. Then 
max (PI(a), Pl(-,a)) = 1 (7) ; min (Bel(a), Bel(-,a)) = 0 (8) ; Bel(a) > 0 � Pl(a) = 1 (9) 
In the following possibility measures are denoted IT for the sake of clarity. The dual measure 
through (1) is then denoted N and calle·d a necessity measure [5]. Zadeh [22] introduces 
possibility. measures from so-called possibility distributions, which are mappings from n to 
[0, 1 ], denoted 1t. A possibility and the dual necessity measure are then obtained as 
1::1 Ac:.O, IT( A) = sup {1t(w) 1 w e A} (1 0) ; N(A) = inf {1 - 1t(w) 1 w e Ac} (11) 
and we then have 1t(w) = IT({w}), 1::1 w. The function 1t can be viewed as a generalized 
characteristic function, i.e. the membership function of a fuzzy set F. Let Fo: be the o: -cut of 
F. i.e., the subset {w I llF(w) � o:} with 1t = llF· It is easy to check that in the finite case the 
set of o: -cuts {F  o: 1 o: e (0,1]} is the set fF of focal elements of the possibility measure IT. 
Moreover, let 1t1 = 1 > � ... > 1tm be the set of distinct values of 1t(w), let 1tm + 1 = 0 by 
convention. and Ai be the 1ti - cut of F, i = 1,m. Then the basic probability assignment m 
underlying IT is completely defined in terms of the possibility distribution 1t as [4] : 
m(A1) = 1t1 - 1ti+1 i = 1,m ; m(A) = 0 otherwise (12) 
tl.Ji.. : Interpreting N(a) as a belief degree as in MYCIN and N(-,a) as a degree of disbelief in a, 
(6), (7) and (8) are assumed 'in MYCIN to be valid. Hence, as pointed out in [5]. MYCIN's 
treatment of uncertainty is partly consistent with possibility theory. 
Among the unjustified criticisms of possibility theory is the statement by Cheeseman 
[2) that it "contains rules such as IT(a A b) = min(IT(a). IT(b))". This is wrong. Only an 
inequality, IT(a ,., b) s min(IT(a), IT(b)) is valid, generally, just as in probability theory. The 
above equality holds in very special cases [5], namely when a and b pertain to variables 
which do not interact with each other. Possibility logic relies on (6) but certainly not on the 
equality mentioned by Cheeseman [2). Possibility logic, just as probabilistic logic is not 
truth-functional. It can even be proved t� in the presence of uncertainty, the two 
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equalities Il(a ..., b) • max(Il(a), Il(b)) and Il(a .... b) = min(Il(a), Il(b)) Cia C:lb, are inconsistent. 
So it is wrong to claim, as Cheeseman [2] does, that possibility theory "assumes a state of 
maximal dependence between components". 
The conventions adopted in this paper to quantify uncertainty can be visually illustrated 
by a rectangle triangle in a Cartesian coordinate system that is reminiscent of Rollinger 
[18]'s conventions (see Figure 1 ). Any point in the Viangle has coordinates (8el(a), 8el(-,a)). 
.5 
Bel(-.a) 
B 
, 
, 
, 
ignorance oc.c'-=-1=-::o--=-=--• A Bel(a) .5 
The x-axis (resp. y-axis) quantifies support for a (resp. 
...,a). Hence any point in the triangle A08 expresses a 
state of knowledge, viewed as a convex combination of 
total certainty for a (vertex A), for ...,a (vertex 8), and 
total ignorance (vertex 0). Probabilistic knowledge lies 
on the A-8 segment, and possibilistic knowledge lies on 
the coordinate axes. Totally uncertain states are 
located on the segment bounded by 0 and R, R being the 
mid-point of the probabilistic segment. 
2 . A short discussion of Cox's axiomatic framework for probability 
Traditionally, a degree of probability can be interpreted as 
- either the ratio between the number of outcomes which realize an event over the number of 
possible outcomes. This is good for games of chance. 
- or the frequency of occurrence of an event, after a sufficient (theoretically infinite) 
number of trials. This is the frequentist view. 
- or a numerical translation of an entity's opinion about the truth of a proposition, given the 
available evidence as termed in [2]. This is the subjectivist view, which has been 
expressed in various settings : axiomatic [3], pragmatic (this is the Bayesian approach to 
betting behavior, and qualitative comparative probability (see [11]) ; we shall focus only on 
Cox's axiomatic view and ask whether such a view exist for belief and possibility 
functions ; see [1 0] for details. See [9] for other views of these functions. 
Cox [3] tried to prove that probability measures were the only possible numerical model 
of "reasonable expectation". He started from the following requirements. Letting f(b 1 a) be a 
measure of the reasonable credibility of the proposition b when the proposition a is known 
to be true. Cox proposes two basic axioms : 
C1. there is some operation • such that f(c .... b 1 a) = f(c 1 b .... a) • f(b 1 a) 
C2. there is a function S such that f(...,b 1 a) = S(f(b 1 a)) 
The following additional technical requirements are used in [3] : 
C3. • and S have both continuous second order derivatives 
Then, f is proved to be isomorphic to a probability measure. The purely technical assumption 
(C3) is very strong and cannot be justified on common sense arguments . For instance • = 
minimum is a solution of C1 Which does not violate the algebra of propositions, but certainly 
violates C3. In fact the unicity result does not require C3, which can be relaxed into a more 
intuitive continuity and monotoriicity assumption. Cox's unicity result � holds under � 
monotonicity assumption [1 0]. Cheeseman [2] proposes Cox's results as a formal proof that 
only probability measures are reasonable for the modeling of subjective uncertainty. His 
claim can be disputed. Although C1 sounds very sensible as a definition of conditional 
credibility function, C2 explicitly states that only one number is enough to describe both the 
uncertainties of b and -,b. Clearly, this . statement rules out the ability to distinguish 
between the notions of posSibility and certainty. This distinction is the very purpose of 
belief functions, possibility measures, and any kind of upper and lower probability system. 
Hence the unicity result is not so surprizing, and Cox's setting, although being an interesting 
attempt at recovering probability measures from a purely non frequentist argument does not 
provide the ultimate answer to uncertainty �delling problems. 
3 . Modeling vagueness 
Cheeseman [2] has proposed a nice definition of vagueness which we shall adopt. namely: 
"vagueness is uncertainty about meaning and can be represented by a probability distribution 
over possible meanings". However, contrastedly with [2], we explain why this view is 
completely consistent with fuzzy sets and with the set-theoretic view of belief functions. 
3.1 MembershiP functjons and intermediary grades of truth 
Consider the statement "Mary is young", represented by the logical formula a = young(x) 
where x stands for the actual value of Mary's age. The set of possible worlds is an age scale 
n. A rough model of "young" consists in letting M(a ) = I0, an interval contained in n, for 
instance the interval [0,25] years. I0 is called the meaning of "young" the subscript c 
indicates the context where the information arises. Then "Mary is young" is true if x e I0 and 
false otherwise. Vagueness arises when there is uncertainty regarding which interval in n 
properly translates "young". Let m(A) be the probability that I0 = A. m(A) can be a 
subjective probability obtained by asking a single individual, or can be a frequency if it 
reflects a proportion of individuals thinking that A properly expresses "young". 
Knowing the age x of Mary, the grade of truth of the statement "Mary is young" is defined 
by the grade of membership J.l.young(x) defined 
IJ.young (x) = 2: A : xe A m(A) ( 1 3) 
llyoung(x) estimates the extent to which the value x is compatible with the meaning of 
"young", formally expressed under the form of a random W i.e. a body of evidence in the 
sense of Shafer [15], [6]. This view is a translation of Cheeseman [2]'s definition of 
vagueness. It becomes exactly Zadeh's definition of a fuzzy set as soon as the family {Ai 1 
m(Ai) > 0} is a nested family· so that the knowledge of the membership function llyoung is 
equivalent to that of the probabiliti�s m(Ai), because (12) is equivalent to (13) (see [6]). Of 
course this nested property is not always completely valid in practice, especially if the Ai's 
come from different individuals. However consonant (nested) approximations of dissonant 
bodies of evidence exist [6], which are especially very good when n iA i  ;: 0, a usually 
satisfied consistency property which expresses that there is an age in n, totally compatible 
with "young". Hence a fuzzy set, with membership function tJ. : n .... [0, 1 ], can always be used 
as an approximation of a random set. However the word "random" may be inappropriate when 
the m(Ai)'s do not express frequencies. One might prefer the term "convex combination of 
sets" , which is more neutral but lengthy. 
Cheeseman [2] claims that a membership function IJ.young is nothing but a conditional 
probability P(young 1 x). This claim is not very well founded. Indeed the existence of a 
quantity such as P(young 1 x) underlies the assumption that 'young' represents an event in the 
usual sense of probability. Hence 'young' is a given subset 10 of n. But then the value of 
P(young I x) is either .Q (x e 10) or 1 (x e 10). This is because x and 10 belong to the same 
universe n. Admitting that P(young 1 x) e (0, 1) leads to admit that 'young' is not a standard 
event but has a membership function ; Zadeh [21] has introduced the notion of the probability 
of a fuzzy event, defined, in the tradition of probability· theory, as the expectation of the 
membership function llyoung· 
P(young) = fn IJ.young(u) d P(u) (14) 
This definition assumes that the a p�iCiri knowledge on Mary's age u is given by a probability 
measure P and is exactly equation (5) of Cheeseman [2] p. 95. When calculating P(young 1 x), 
Mary's age is known (u = x) and P(young) = P(young I x) = llyoung(x). But because in that case 
the available information (u = x) is deterministic, P(. 1 X!) is a Dirac measure (P(ulx) = 1 if 
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u =x, and 0 otherwise) and writing P(young 1 x) is just a matter of convention, one could write 
Bel(young 1 x), IT(young 1 x) etc ... as well, since a Dirac measure is also a particular case of 
belief function, possibility measure, etc ... ! If one admits as Hisdal [12] that concepts like 
'young' have clear-cut meanings for single individuals, but become fuzzy when a group of 
individuals is considered, then P(younglx) reflects the proportion of individuals that claim 
that x agre.es-wltiL their.. notion of young; then f.l.young can be given a probabilistic 
interpretation (as a likelihood function). This is also in accordance with (13) if m(A) denotes 
the proportion of individuals for whom 'young' means A. 
3.2 Uncertainty and graded truth 
Note that f.l.young(x) is really a grade of truth of the statement "Mary is young" knowing 
that x is the actual age of Mary. It is not a grade of uncertainty about the truth of the 
statement. The statement is partially true (f.l.young(x) e (0,1 )) as long as x is a borderline age 
for the concept young (e.g. x = 30 in a given context). We can get grades of uncertainty about 
truth when reversing the problem, namely finding whether Mary's age (a variable u) is x, 
given that "Mary is young". The statement "Mary's age is x" can only be true or .false but its 
truth may not be known. Let g(young,x) be the grade of possibility (or upper probability) that 
Mary is young aru1 her age is x. We now wish to compute g(xlyoung) i.e. the degree of 
possibility that Mary's age is x gjyen that she is young. Using Cox's axiom C1 we get 
g(young , x) = g(young I x) 
• 
g(x) = g(x I young) 
• 
g(young) (15) 
where " is some unspecified (non-decreasing, associative) combination operation such that 
a " 1 = a, 0 .. 0 = 0. This decomposition is the basis of conditional probability definition, 
with g = P, • = product. It is by definition valid for any measure of uncertainty, consistently 
with Cox [3]'s proposal. Let us evaluate various terms. in order to calculate g(x 1 young). 
g(young I x) "' f.l.young(x) as shown above, regardless of the nature of g. 
g(A) expresses the a priori knowledge about Mary's. age belonging to A. We shall assume 
the state of total ignorance, so that g(A) = 1 A "' 0, since g(A) is a degree of 
plausibility, consistently with section 1. Particularly g(x) = 1 and g(young) = 1. 
As a consequence (15) leads to a well known equation in likelihood theory : 
g(x I young) = g(young I x) = f.l.young(x) (16) 
When g is, stricto sensu, a possibility measure, (16) is exactly Zadeh's basic identity [22] 
which translates a verbal statement (such as "Mary is young") into a possibility distribution 
1t restricting the age u of Mary, defined by 7t(U = x) = f.l.young(x) (17) 
i.e. f.l.young(x) is interpreted as the grade of possibility that u = x given that "Mary is young" : 
it is .o.sll the degree of truth of 'u = x'. Contrastedly, the degree of certainty C(x 1 young) can 
be computed using (1) and Dempster-Shafer framework as 
C(x 1 young) 7 � A,;. {x} m(A) = m ({x}) (18) 
i.e. C(x 1 young) = 0 (no certainty) generally because "young" usually refers to an age interval, 
and not to a precise age, so �that m seldom bears on singletons. Hence, contrary to what is 
claimed in [12], conditional distributions of xiA. and A.lx (where A. is a fuzzy predicate) are 
distinct in possibility theory, provided that we consider both measures of possibility and 
necessity. 
So, Cheeseman [2]'s view of vagueness looks .consistent with possibility theory, much 
more than with probability theory when the a priori knowle<;Jge about the variable underlying 
a vague predicate is not available. Note that if this a priori knowledge were indeed available 
under the form of a probability measure P then (15) is specialized into 
P(x I young) = f.l.young(x) . [P(x) I P(young)] (19) 
which indeed defines a probability measure on n that is a revision of the a priori probability 
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P on the basis of the fuzzy event "Mary is young". If this vague statement were precise, i.e. 
"Mary's age is in 10" then ( 19) becomes the well known conditioning formula 
P(xllcl • P(x) I P(l0 )
. 
if x e 10 ; P(xll0) = 0 otherwise (20) 
so (20), (19) and (17) can be regarded as particular consequences of Cox's axiom C1. 
3.3 Uncertain eyjdence 
Suppose as in Cheeseman [21 that the following information about Mary is that "Mary is 
probably young". This statement is denoted S. Cheeseman [21 models this statement by means 
of a conditional probability P(young 1 S) where once more the events appearing in the 
probability are not very well defined. Surprizingly, no attempt is made to apply the maximum 
entropy principle to this case. Indeed if we want to compute g(x 1 S) as a probability, a 
natural approach would be to solve the following program (.0 is finite) : 
find p which maximize - Iw. en. p(wi) log p(wi) under the constraint P(lc) � ex (21) I 
where [ex, 1] is a numerical. translation of "probable" appearing in S. The interval lc 
supposedly expresses the term ·"young". The solution of the above problem is simply, where 1.1 
denotes cardinality : P(xiS) = ex /llcl if x e 10 ; P(x!S)= (1 - ex) I (101 - llcl) if x E 10 (22) 
When ex =1, we get a particular case of (20) where the a priori probability distribution is 
uniform. The above representation is good to decjde what is Mary's age, not to represent our 
state of knowledge, when the a priori probability distribution is not available. In tha't91 case, 
statement S translates into C(l0)=ex where C(l0) is a lower probability degree, here a degree 
of belief in the sense of Shafer. We need some least information principle, which, in the 
scope of simply representing knowledge, would maximize the imprecision contained in the 
belief function Bel-C. A simple evaluation of the imprecision of the statement "Mary is 
young", where "young" translates into· the interval 10, is the cardinality of 10. Wheh llc1=1 then 
we know Mary's age, when 10=0 we have no information. More generally if Mary's age is known 
under the form of a random set (ff ,m). the imprecision is measured by 
J(ff,m)l =LA_. n. m(A) • IAI (23) 
which is an expected cardinality. Hence the problem of representing the meaning of a 
statement such as "Mary is probably young", where "probably" is viewed as specifying a lower 
bound on a probability value and "young" is viewed as a clearcut category approximated by a 
subset 10, is that of solving the following program 
find m which maximizes LA c 0 m(A).IAI under the constraint Bel(lc) = LA c 1 m(A) = ex (24) c 
This is the principle of minimum specificity [7]. The solution of (24) is easily found 
m(l0 I S) = ex ; m(O I S) : 1 - ex (25) 
Note that this solution is a possibility measure whose 
distribution is rt(xiS) =1 if x e 10, rt(xJS) = 1 - ex otherwise 
(see Fig. 2). Moreover it encompasses the solution given by 
the maximum entropy principle as a particular case, namely 
1 -« 1---:1 l:f A.- 0 Bei(AIS) ::;; P(AIS) ::;; Pf(AIS) (26) 
O"-------• i.e. the probability measJre obtained by (22) is in the set of 
I c =young � probability measures implicitly defined by Bel and PI, viewed as upper and lower probabilities. 
This approach to the representation of uncertain knowledge can be extended to the case 
when "young" is expressed, not as an interval, but as a fuzzy interval (e.g. [17]). Note that the 
maximum entropy principle can also accommodate fuzziness in the statement of constraints 
changing P(l0) into P(young) as defined by (14). 
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Conc lusion 
This paper has tried to show that as far as knowledge representation is concerned, there 
should not be any dispute regarding the well-foundedness of possibility and fuzzy set theory, 
belief functions, versus probability theory. The latter is older and is presently far more 
developed than the two former. So, they are easy to criticize from the stand-point of 
probability theory. However the development of new models of uncertainty for knowledge 
representation seems to be an important issue, because of limitations of probability theory 
in terms of descriptive power. The new models such as possibility and evidence theories are 
not built a a aj nst probability. theory, but in the same spirit ; indeed most of the new 
uncertainty measures can be viewed as upper and lower probability measures. Hence 
probability theory itself is a basic tool for the construction of new models of uncertain 
knowledge. The present situation of probability theory is similar to the situation of 
classical logic in the mid-seventies. Classical logic has been given up by some researchers, 
when modelling common sense knowledge, but the idea of a logic has been preserved, and new 
logics (default logics for instance) have arised. In the case of uncertainty models, it seems 
important to go beyond probability but consistently with probability theory itself. Of course 
the authors are aware of the bulk of work needed to bring possibility and evidence theories 
to the level of development of probability theory. In that sense many results reported in the 
literature about foundations and combination rules are certainly preliminary. But we 
strongly question dogmatic attitudes disputing alternative theories of uncertainty on behalf 
of rationality. Modelling uncertainty, and especially subjective uncertainty, cannot be but a 
compromise between the ideally optimal Bayesian theory and the limited precision and 
vagueness of the available often subjective knowledge. 
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